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t is a common (and comforting) belief that in 
ternational aid projects exist to spread human 
rights and democracy globally. How this actu 
ally happens is not self-evident. The most satisfying 
explanation, at least from a Western point of view, 
is that International Non-Governmental Organi 
zations (INGO) establish transnational links that 
foster a cohesive local civil society by reinforcing 
citizens' political and spiritual aspirations through 
institutionalized networks of solidarity.1 Once citi 
zens have access to international resources, innate 
universal democratic values will be unleashed. 
People will then take the next step to join forces, 
demand basic rights and free elections, and topple 
authoritarian rule.
The belief has been particularly popular with 
respect to the post-Soviet states on the grounds 
that the region's fragmented or non-existing civil 
societies continue to be the primary obstacle to 
democratization. For example, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, one of the largest 
donors of technical assistance to the former Soviet 
Union, confidently claims to have trained the key 
democratic actors and “created the network of civic 
minded people” necessary to launch Ukraine's Or 
ange Revolution in 2004, as well as Georgia's Rose 
Revolution and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution of 
2005.2 Without taking a position on this particular 
claim, this article aims to understand to what ex 
tent INGO efforts have been successful at rooting 
a Western-style civil society. More specifically, I 
will discuss how INGOs use a Western paradigm 
of civil society to implement projects that attempt 
to build institutions and establish networks of re 
form-oriented citizens. I will argue that this model 
impedes the international community from under 
standing the complications of local society which 
might make them function more effectively. Given
1. Amyn B. Sajoo, Civil Society in the Muslim World: 
Contemporary Perspective (New York: IB Tauris, 2002) p 1.
2. “Democracy,” USAID Frontlines, January 2006, April 22 
2007, <http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_jan06/democ- 
racy.html>.
the prevalence of this model, I raise the question 
whether the real aim of foreign assistance is to pro 
mote a cohesive local civil society capable of orga 
nizing itself autonomously with respect to the inter 
national community and local government.
My focus is Tajikistan, the smallest and the 
poorest of the former Soviet republics. After a mur 
derous civil war that was fought from 1991 to 1997, 
Tajikistan has been ruled by an ever-more authori 
tarian parliamentary system under the presidency 
of Emomali Rakhmon. The deterioration of Tajiki 
stan's economy, coupled with the fact that it shares 
a 750-mile border with Afghanistan, has made the 
country the subject of assiduous aid efforts, particu 
larly in view of U.S. global security concerns after 
9/11. In 2006 alone, Tajikistan was the recipient of 
$180 million dollars in official development assis- 
tance.3 Of this $180 million, USAID provided $16 
million, with disbursements totaling $240 million 
since 1992.4 Through the Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) pro 
gram, the European Union provided 14 million Eu 
ros in 2006.5 * *Though Tajikistan's urban population 
is only one million, the two major towns, Dushanbe 
and Khujand, are home to over one hundred inter 
national organizations, the majority of which fo 
cus on rebuilding civil society through specialized 
projects that promote agriculture and land reform, 
gender equality, and legal reform.
Foreign assistance in Tajikistan has undoubt 
edly created a sector with formal elements that re 
semble a Western civil society. The community of 
INGOs representing Western values has integrated 
itself into Tajik society to the point that many of the 
best qualified English-speaking graduates of lo 
cal universities have become dependent on them
3. Full details on ODA flows can be found at http://www. 
untj.org/principals/tracking/summary.php?year+2006>.
4. Details of USAID project disbursements can be found at 
<http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia?car?pdfs?facts 
heet_tj.pdf>.




for employment. Citizens rely on them for basic 
modern services, including internet, foreign-lan 
guage classes, and cultural activities, for example, 
movie-going, which would have been provided by 
the state under Soviet rule. Finally, the international 
community has a large enough presence that the 
Tajik government cannot easily bypass it in policy 
making on a range of key issues, such as freedom 
of press, security, and land reform. INGOs appear 
to act like a civil society insofar as they provide an 
arena of apparent autonomy, if not subtle opposi 
tion to the state.
On the basis of my fieldwork6 as well as my 
reading of civil society studies and INGO civil soci 
ety projects, I would maintain that INGOs have cre 
ated a “bubble civil society,” infused with Western 
rhetoric and resources, but without effective roots 
in Tajik society. By bubble civil society, I refer to 
INGO resources (equipment, services, and support 
from Western governments) that have attracted key 
actors (mainly government, elites, and motivated 
youth), enabling them to hook into the resources. 
But they are not necessarily reform-minded, nor 
does the assistance create strong links of solidarity 
among members even among other groups outside 
of the particular sector for which aid is provided. 
This happens for two reasons: first, INGOs ignore 
existing systems of social networks and the depen 
dency of citizens on clans or informal organization 
of political and social networks of Tajikistan that 
were established during the pre-Soviet as well as 
Soviet political systems.7 Second, as INGOs attempt 
to collaborate and build relations of solidarity with 
local individuals on project implementation, West 
ern staff members establish their own new relations 
of hierarchy with local employees.8 Local staff has 
very little voice in their operations and can only 
participate by articulating Tajikistan's problems 
in terms of Western universal rights rhetoric. Of 
ten this rhetoric fails to reflect the nuances of Tajik
6. Interviews were conducted over a two week period in 
January 2007 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The individuals I inter 
viewed were western representatives, as well as local citizens 
who currently work for Western funded international organiza 
tions.
7. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in 
Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5. 
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the Outside,” The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical look at
Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, ed. Sarah E.
Mendelson and John K. Glenn, (New York: Columbia Univer 
sity Press, 2002) p.179.
8. Sarah Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary 
Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 164-165.
society. The bubble civil society created by INGOs 
thus accommodates both international and local ac 
tors' interests just enough to distract or deter both 
of them from making real institutional change in 
Tajikistan. As local actors reconfigure themselves 
to engage with international actors and resources, 
they try to adapt the organizations to their own in 
terests. Once this dynamic has been institutional 
ized, it contributes to maintaining the status quo, 
obstructing any new dialogue about social values 
and politics, much less new social movements.
To explain this phenomenon, this article will 
look at the “scripts” for the bubble society in West 
ern ideas of civil society before looking more close 
ly at the interaction between international and local 
actors and the contrast between larger INGO goals 
and the interests of local actors. At the center of my 
research, is a case study of ABA/CEELI, an Ameri 
can INGO in Tajikistan funded by USAID to pro 
mote criminal law reform and legal education. The 
case of ABA/CEELI demonstrates how an initial 
focus on legal reform becomes diluted as actors re 
configure themselves to the project and resources.
The script for INGO action can be traced in its 
American version to a universal concept of civil so 
ciety that is constructed on a romanticized vision 
of how civil society ostensibly functioned in U.S. 
history and culture. In Thomas Carothers' words, 
U.S. foreign assistance defines a vibrant civil soci 
ety as “a society in which ordinary citizens are en 
gaged in all cross cutting civic participation with 
thousands of earnest, diligent civic groups working 
assertively but constructively to help ensure that a 
reluctant government gradually becomes respon 
sive to citizen's needs and sheds its habits of indo 
lence and corruption.”9 Behind this vision stands a 
particular interpretation of Alexis De Tocqueville's 
often-quoted remarks on America as the “most 
democratic country in the world” in which citizens 
have “perfected the art of pursuing in concert the 
aim of their common desires and have applied this 
technique to the greatest of objectives”10
However, a proper reading of Tocqueville's con 
cept is useful to understand the problems INGOs 
face in Tajikistan today. Tocqueville made the point 
that “not only does democracy make men forget 
their ancestors but also hides their descendents.”11 
And American style-civil society institutions could
9. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learn 
ing Curve (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna 
tional Peace, 1999), 222..
10. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New 




thus be conceived as carved out of the breakup of 
networks based on class, clans, and family ties. If 
democracy is contingent on a society in which tra 
ditional networks have been transformed, then it is 
evident that democratization would be particularly 
difficult for Tajikistan. Post-Soviet Tajikistan has an 
existing traditional civil society in which citizens 
identify first and foremost with their local clan net 
work, rather than political parties, ethnic groups, or 
a democratic opposition to the state.12 Rather than 
acknowledging the historically peculiar origins of 
democratic associations in the U.S., proponents of 
exporting democracy see civil society as a blank 
slate. Accordingly, informal networks in Tajikistan 
are simply sources of backwardness and corrup 
tion that need to be erased. INGOs are especially 
reluctant to recognize local networks whose values 
conflict with Western or U.S. interests. For example, 
the U.S. government labels the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU), a social network tied to po 
litical Islam that attracts individuals from all over 
Central Asia, as a terrorist group. Although donors 
and governments condemn these kinds of civic net 
works, they nonetheless are forms of civil society in 
that they act in opposition to the state.13
Janine Wedel is helpful on this point in her 
book on foreign aid in post-Soviet Russia. Wedel 
calls attention to the fact that one cannot simply 
view the delivery of aid to developing countries as 
a “transmission belt.” Rather, “aid appears more 
like a series of chemical reactions that begin with 
the donors' policies, but are transformed by the 
agendas, interests, and interactions of donor and 
recipient representatives.” Furthermore, “each side 
influences the other and the result is often qualita 
tively different from the plan envisioned.”14 INGOs 
are not delivering foreign assistance to passive and 
voiceless recipients. Aid providers may imagine lo 
cal society as a “pristine domain, free of the murky 
ties and tensions of ethnicity, class, clan, and politi 
cal partisanship, as Thomas Carothers observes.”15 
By flattening out the complexity of local societies 
and their history, “the nonwestern subject,” in the 
words of historian Bonny Ibhawoh, ends up being 
treated as “needy, incapable of self-government, 
and in need of long-term external assistance.” This
12. Collins, 1.
13. Adamson, 178. Also, Olivier Roy “Soviet Legacies and 
Western Aid Imperatives in the New Central Asia,” Civil Society 
in the Muslim World, ed. Amyn Sajoo (New York: I.B. Tauris,
2002), 136.
14. Janine Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of 
Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1998), 8.
15. Carothers, 212.
view panders to turning foreign aid into a “moral 
fairy tale of distress and rescue.”16 In the end, to 
quote the very expert Olivier Roy, INGOs use civil 
society as “the means to groom ‘true' democrats, 
which often means bypassing real political actors, 
or ‘civilizing' them by recasting their agendas in 
terms compatible with western thinking.”17
The point is not to dismiss the work of INGOs 
by putting forth a cultural relativist claim that as 
sumes Western agendas are incompatible with 
local values and norms. Instead, the question be 
comes how does the INGO world reconcile itself 
with local society, and, in turn, what parts of Tajik 
society have molded and appropriated the pres 
ence of INGOs?
INGOs are grappling with a particularly tena 
cious society with several subtleties that tend to 
be concealed by informal institutions. Studies of 
post-war civil society in Tajikistan have tended to 
describe it as a deeply fragmented and “atomized 
society” whereby “disintegrative factors cross 
cut and dissect one another, splitting society into 
ever smaller units.”18 The result is that “autarkic 
behavior becomes the norm” and various forms 
of corruption dominate interest-based social and 
political interactions. Although the civil war in 
Tajikistan brought regional and ethnic tensions 
to a climax, like elsewhere in Central Asia, there 
has always been traditional society, by which I 
mean networks of solidarity and trust based on 
kinship ties through which individuals can ex 
press common interests, resist encroachments of 
the state, as well as compensate for services that 
the weak state is not providing.19 Tajikistan was a 
“peripheral state” of the Soviet Union, according 
to Barnett Rubin, providing raw materials for the 
empire in exchange for social benefits and infra 
structure which were subsidized by wealthier So 
viet states. To ensure Tajikistan's collaboration, the 
Soviet system distributed the resources through 
existing traditional networks. Observing the role 
of patron-client relations, Rubin writes, “Territo-
16. Bonny Ibhawoh, “Human Rights INGOs and the 
North-South Gap: The Challenge of Normative and Empirical 
Learning,” Ethics in action: The Ethical Challenges of International 
Human Right Nongovermental Organizations, ed. Daniel Bell and 
Kean Marc Coicaud (New York: Cambridge University Press), 
87
17. Olivier Roy, “The Predicament of Civil Society in 
Central Asia” International Aff airs 81, 5 (2005): 1003.
18. Shirin Akiner, “Prospects of Civil Society in Tajiki 
stan,” Civil Society in the Muslim World, ed. Amyn Sajoo (New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 161.
19. Sabine Freizer, “Neoliberal and Communal Civil So 
ciety in Tajikistan: Merging or Dividing the Post War Period,” 
Central Asian Survey, vol 24 (September 2005): 227.
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rial identities remained key to patterns of redistri 
bution [of resources] precisely because Tajikistan 
was created as a strategic periphery of the Soviet 
Empire, subject to a form of disguised indirect rule 
with relatively weak penetration and surveillance 
by the central state.”20 The Soviet system and tra 
ditional networks constantly interacted and nego 
tiated with one another, mutually solidifying their 
positions of power.
This interpenetration of state and local, patron 
and client, new networks and family-based clans 
held throughout the whole kolkhoz agricultural sys 
tem, according to Oliver Roy. Far from abolishing 
traditional rural linkages through the establish 
ment of collective farms; “solidarity groups (were) 
reincarnated within the structures of pre-existing 
groups.” In turn, local party systems grafted them 
selves onto these informal networks.21 During the 
Soviet era the leading clan from the northern re 
gion of Khujand was the dominating power; other 
groupings of so-called “traditional society” were 
constantly in a process of negotiation with them. 
Through formal and informal institutions there has 
always been inter-clan competition. If the Soviet 
system, with its idea of revolutionizing traditional 
relations, became so involved in local identities and 
solidarities, it is easy to imagine the powerful re 
sistance Western foreign aid projects face as they 
step into the oscillation between formal and infor 
mal politics.
Contemporary politics at a national level in 
post-civil war Tajikistan is still marked by clans, 
although different ones from those that dominated 
during the Soviet era. The end of the civil war gave 
rise to a new clan from the Kulyab region, the home 
territory of President Emomali Rakhmon. Although 
the peace agreement in 1997 was officially set up 
to balance different clan and regional tensions, the 
government has increasingly played a game of 
exclusionary politics, and more people from this 
region occupy positions in the formal institutions 
of government. The Swedish expert on Tajik for 
eign policy, Lena Jonson, writes that President Ra- 
khmon's strategy is to be at the top of the pyramid 
of clan politics by consolidating “his own narrow 
power base—the Kulyab district—and secure the 
imbalance of power between the regions... prevent 
ing the regions from becoming political actors in
confrontation with the central government.”22 For 
example, Rakhmon felt threatened by his formal 
Presidential Guard, Gaffor Mirzoev, who in 2004 
was replaced by Colonel Rajab Rakhmonaliev, a 
native of the Dangara area in the Kulyab region.23 
Moreover, he reorganized the central government 
so that former ministers not from his region were 
sent to work at embassies abroad. Political Scientist 
Kathleen Collins, an expert on clans in Central Asia, 
observed that the role of clans and informal institu 
tions peaked with Rakhmon's government.24
The implications for INGOs in Tajikistan are 
twofold. First, ordinary citizens, including employ 
ees of INGOs, are forced to resort to different forms 
of corruption and informal networks to obtain work 
positions and status in Tajik society. Second, this 
kind of corruption destabilizes the regime, making 
the process of democratization through formal in 
stitutions much harder. For their survival, not only 
individual citizens must maneuver between formal 
and informal institutions, but INGOS must do so 
as well. For the INGO, survival means renewing 
contracts with donors, and successfully implement 
ing projects without threatening local government 
authorities. Circumventing these obstacles often 
poses a challenge to the moral priorities of INGOs. 
In the best of circumstances, as Fiona Adamson 
writes referring to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
democracy assistance programs do not realize their 
potential because INGOs, for the most part, take a 
long time to understand the distinctions between 
the formal institutions of society and the real seat of 
power, because informal networks of patronage or 
personal influence are difficult for outsiders to ac- 
cess.25 In Tajikistan, an international representative 
from OXFAM, an organization that mainly focuses 
on gender equality and improving agriculture in 
rural Tajikistan, bitterly complained that the proj 
ects had ultimately become services that replaced 
duties of the state, for example, clean water for vil 
lagers or providing fertilizer for farmers. However, 
the moment OXFAM wanted to make structural 
challenges by questioning legislation with regard 
to land reform and farmers rights, it was immedi 
ately blocked by the local government. In order to 
continue implementing projects or at least continue 
to provide the basic services, OXFAM was forced to 
make several compromises, including negotiations
20. Barnett Rubin, “Russian Hegemony and State 
Breakdown in the Periphery: Cause and Consequence of the 
Civil War in Tajikistan,” ed. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, 
Post-Soviet Political Order: Confl ict and State Building (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 140-146.
21. Roy, 128.
22. Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopoli 







with corrupt local officials.26 The French INGO, 
ACTED, recently paid local officials fines, because 
the office building had violated a series of numer 
ous but dubious safety violations.27 Moreover, IN- 
GOs in Tajikistan constantly struggle and blame 
their inability to implement projects on the fact that 
they face several obstacles in this authoritarian en 
vironment, including the basic day-to-day opera 
tions of an office.
Finally, to come to grips with the behavior of 
INGOS with regard to security and survival in a 
politically contentious environment, it is indispens 
able to examine the so-called ‘Big Game' between 
the Tajik and Western governments, as well as what 
might be termed the local games between INGOs, 
local organizations, and the media. For example, 
although Rakhmon closely monitors INGOs, he is 
also willing to cooperate to the extent that it will 
help consolidate his regime. Thus an INGO's sur 
vival often depends on the support from their gov 
ernments and not the collaboration with other IN- 
GOs in the international community. Contrary to 
what one would think, the increase in INGOs often 
leads to competition over funding, often to the det 
riment of cooperating to construct a unified vision 
of civil society.28
Although aid is articulated through idealis 
tic rhetoric emphasizing democratic human rights 
values, the INGO sector in Tajikistan is inherently 
connected with the power of foreign governments 
to influence and put certain pressures on domes 
tic governments. As the international community 
expressed interest in reform and partnership with 
Tajikistan, Rakhmon gladly entered into dialogue 
and negotiations as a way to strengthen his regime 
and have his position as leader internationally rec 
ognized. The ultimate paradox for the case of Ta 
jikistan is that international presence becomes a 
kind of prerequisite to participate in the big game 
of politics and great powers. To be exact, Presi 
dent Rakhmon has a foreign policy that is open to 
embracing international actors such as the United 
States as long as it consolidates his position as 
leader, while combating issues that are a menace to 
his regime. One instance is the porous border with 
Afghanistan that threatens to import terrorism and 
Islamic groups opposed to him. The paradox is that
26. Interview with Country Director of Oxfam, Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, 10 January, 2007.
27. Interview with Western representative working for 
ACTED, Dushanbe, January 15, 2007.
28. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO
Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy 
of Transnational Action,” International Security, vol. 27, no.1
(Summer 2002): 5-39.
president Rakhmon is able to strengthen his grip by 
claiming that he is modernizing the country while 
combating terrorism. As a result, foreign aid and 
the presence of the international community legiti 
mate his rule.
Nonetheless, INGOs proved to be an obstacle 
to Rakhmon on certain points. By entering into ne 
gotiation with the big powers, he could not entirely 
dismiss the presence of INGOs. Commenting on 
Rakhmon's political system, Lena Jonson writes 
that the “regime, which on the one hand had an 
interest in introducing reforms, on the other hand 
feared the political implications of these dynam 
ics for society and for its own capacity.”29 *Specifi 
cally, Western media successfully provoked fear in 
Rakhmon by attributing the Tulip Revolution in 
2005 in Kyrgystan to Western-funded NGOs. Just 
as Rakhmon is forced to concede and acknowledge 
the presence and some of the demands of INGOs, 
they are also forced to make compromises to ensure 
their own survival by not being overly threatening 
to the regime. Moreover, this atmosphere of cau 
tion has the effect of maintaining the status quo, 
where all sides remain firmly in control. This was 
particularly visible during a five-day workshop 
sponsored by UNDP on anti-corruption methods 
for Tajik Members of Parliament. The parliamen 
tarians happily attended the workshop, which was 
held at a spa in the mountains nearby. Parliamen 
tarians openly accepted handouts, guide books, 
and attended the lectures. However, they showed 
little interest in reforming the budget system, and 
there was an upheaval when the two international 
consultants criticized the Soviet system and told 
them they had been colonized. In other words, the 
parliamentarians were willing to collaborate with 
the international consultants in so far as their ba 
sic interests were met—mainly that of attending a 
workshop and obtaining professional experience. 
However, they remained entirely loyal to the exec 
utive branch, and criticized the consultant's model 
that depicted a balance of powers. The consultants 
had little leeway or resources to further negotiate 
with the group of parliamentarians.
Despite external difficulties INGOs encounter 
when trying to establish relations with formal insti 
tutions and government officials, there are several 
factors internal to INGOs that hinder their capac 
ity to build a unified civil society amongst citizens. 
INGOs are dependent on their local staff and local 
NGOs to implement projects and maintain con 




ever, local staff and local NGOs have no authority 
to change project proposals and can only articulate 
the issues in terms of Western rhetoric. Political Sci 
entist Clifford Bob observes that local initiatives in 
Latin America and in Africa often become ineffec 
tual as they “conform themselves to the needs and 
expectations of potential backers in Western na 
tions. They simplify and universalize their claims, 
making them relevant to the broader missions and 
interests of key global players. In particular they 
match themselves to the substantive concerns and 
organizational imperatives of large transnational 
NGOs.”30 The result is that official institutions of 
ten grow weary of INGO local staff and their inten 
tions. In addition, very superficial and weak links 
are created between local staff or local NGOs rep 
resenting INGO values with existing networks of 
power and formal institutions. Furthermore, as lo 
cal staff becomes dependent on international actors 
for employment and status, they are simultaneous 
ly marginalizing themselves and developing no le 
verage to influence politics and state institutions. In 
sum, local staff of INGOs and local NGOs may be 
come members of the international community. But 
they are excluded from decision-making in both the 
“bubble civil society” as well as in Tajikistan's exist 
ing, albeit weak, civil society.
To better understand how a civil society proj 
ect takes root in Tajikistan and the obstacles that 
arise in the interaction between Western liberal 
ideals and the on-the-ground realities, let us now 
consider more closely a case of an American INGO 
that has been present in Tajikistan since 1997. At the 
end of the Cold War in 1990, the Central European 
and Eurasian Law Initiative (CEELI), a public ser 
vice project of the American Bar Association, was 
established with the mission to contribute to the de 
mocratization and transition of former Communist 
states throughout the Balkans, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the Soviet Union by providing train 
ing and technical assistance to legal professionals. 
CEELI's main donors are USAID, the U.S. State 
Department, and the U.S. Department of Justice, 
which provide law-oriented aid, geared towards 
reshaping and strengthening a nation's legal sys 
tem. Drawing support from American lawyers and 
judges, including Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor who is a board member, CEELI has 
provided over 150 million dollars in pro-bono assis 
tance. Furthermore, CEELI has radically expanded 
by initiating rule of law projects throughout coun 
tries in the Middle East, including Iraq.
30. Clifford Bob, “Merchants of Morality,” Foreign Policy, 
no. 129 (March-April 2002), 40.
CEELI represents a classic example of an ini 
tiative that envisions promoting a particularly 
American neo-Tocquevillian outlook on civil soci 
ety. CEELI's mission is grounded in the belief that 
the rule of law and strong legal associations are a 
fundamental component for democracy and a ba 
sic part of American “culture fabric.”31 To be exact, 
CEELI's projects are based on a notion of civil so 
ciety that emphasizes the strengthening of demo 
cratic institutions to enable them to uphold the law, 
as well as provide checks and balance on the ex 
cesses of executive power. In other words, the goal 
is to create a space whereby citizens can peacefully 
express dissent and are guaranteed protection from 
the state infringing upon their fundamental rights, 
such as access to a fair trial free of corruption as 
well as gender equality. It emphasizes democratiza 
tion by upholding negative rights.32 In the case of 
Tajikistan, this means working mostly with urban 
professionals as opposed to organizing grassroots 
movements in impoverished rural areas.
In order to carry out this vision of civil society 
in Tajikistan, CEELI has implemented a number of 
different projects that aim to reform existing legal 
institutions, redraft laws, and raise standards of 
the legal profession. CEELI has two small offices 
in Tajikistan: one is located in the capital Dushanbe, 
and the other Khujand, the second largest city and 
home of the powerful clan that during the Soviet 
period dominated the country's resources and key 
political positions. Currently, CEELI runs two pro 
grams funded by USAID and INL.
The first is a criminal law program with a bud 
get of $300,000 dollars extended over a period of 
two years. The Criminal Law Reform Program has 
a “top-down approach,”33 meaning that the focus is 
institution capacity building with the objective of 
forming a bar association for criminal defense ad 
vocates and enhance solidarity to strengthen their 
position in the court system. By providing train 
ing for criminal defense advocates, CEELI attempts 
to plant seeds of reform, primarily by combating 
corruption amongst prosecutors and judges.34 The 
second project is a legal education program called 
“My Civic Standing,, which can be best understood 
as a “bottom-up approach”35 with projects geared
31. Mission statement on a judicial ethics project document 
for Tajikistan, 2005.
32. Judy Howell and Jenny Pearce, Civil Society and 
Development: A Critical Exploration (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2001), 59.
33. Carothers, 168.





to target “the people,” in this case the next genera 
tion of Tajik citizens, by teaching basic concepts of 
international human rights in schools and summer 
camps. This program attempts to equip young citi 
zens and student lawyers with the rhetoric of rights 
(which are officially protected by the Tajik constitu 
tion) in order to enhance their capacity to confront 
the oppressive state. Moreover, to bring about de 
mocratization, CEELI uses a combined approach 
that targets both state institutions as well young 
citizens at the grassroots level, drawing on several 
different local actors.
The internal organization of CEELI's offices are 
such that all projects are supervised and managed 
by a salaried country director, in addition to two 
U.S. lawyers or “liaisons” who volunteer their ex 
pertise and legal skills for a year and are respon 
sible for maintaining relations with donors and 
representatives of other international organiza 
tions in Tajikistan. The country director, who had 
recently arrived in Dushanbe, explained that she 
envisioned herself as a representative of the Ameri 
can legal system, and as a toolbox filled with skills 
and resources to offer Tajikistan. However, she also 
admits that her primary reason for taking up this 
three-year paid position in Dushanbe is to advance 
her career by serving her time out on the field, mak 
ing her more competitive on the U.S. job market.36
Even though the law liaisons are “volunteers” 
their living standard in Dushanbe is incomparably 
higher than that of local staff ; moreover, they have 
access to special staff, including chauffeurs. Even 
so, they are entirely dependent on the local staff, for 
they rarely speak Russian and are generally unin 
formed about Tajik politics and society, having had 
little or no prior contact with post-Soviet countries. 
Moreover, the rapid turnover of U.S. staff makes 
it difficult to have an enduring impact. Liaisons 
are contracted for a one-year period to manage a 
project, a short period given the fact that it often 
takes four months to build personal networks and 
a reputation within the international community as 
well as become acquainted with the Tajik legal sys 
tem. The result is that they are unable to become 
invested in the projects, even if they want to. As it 
stands, upon completing their service liaisons often 
leave without guaranteeing a project's continued 
funding, which results in the project's termination, 
thus putting an end to any progress.37
36. Interview with Country Director of CEELI, Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, January 10, 2007.
37. Interview with Local Staff Attorney Criminal Law 
Program, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, January 6, 2007.
The local staff is predominantly composed of 
young Tajiks from middle-class professional fami 
lies, who benefited from education and status dur 
ing the Soviet era. Generally speaking, the local staff 
possess good English skills and are recent gradu 
ates from either the faculty of law or international 
relations in Tajikistan. The local staff's main re 
sponsibility is project implementation. They handle 
relations with local cooperating partners, assist in 
conducting U.S.-style training sessions, and are re 
sponsible for all translation. The local staff does not 
have the authority to alter or tailor project goals to 
make them more suited for the environment. None 
theless, CEELI does provide a number of resources 
for staff, including a professional environment that 
offers higher salaries, internet access, cell phones, 
and opportunities for staff to gain professional de 
velopment and experience abroad. In addition, in 
the past several CEELI staff members made suc 
cessful applications to study abroad on scholarship 
programs funded by the Soros Foundation or the 
U.S. government. However, the majority of scholar 
ship recipients, upon their return to Tajikistan, con 
tinue to work in international organizations.38 To 
be precise, Western scholarship funds and INGOs 
such as CEELI invest in training a group of poten 
tial reformers that in turn are supposed to become 
loyal to their resources and ideology. However, if 
they remain part of the international community, 
whether they are reform-minded or not, they be 
come further detached from local society, and ulti 
mately loose their capacity to influence politics and 
formal institutions.39
Besides local staff, CEELI has involved local 
actors, including lawyers and judges, who have re 
ceived training on a wide range of topics, such as 
legal ethics and trial skills. The main incentive for 
local participants is to utilize the training for profes 
sional development and temporarily take part in an 
international and more modern work environment. 
By providing this training for legal professionals, 
CEELI is replacing a function of the state. A typi 
cal training session at CEELI on judicial ethics will 
consist of a presentation of the international prin 
ciples of judicial conduct, a video presentation and 
discussion of a day in the life of an American judge 
in California, and a discussion of hypothetical situ 
38. Interview with former CEELI employee, Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, January 16, 2007.
39. Interview with Tajik scholar who claimed that IOs 
were constantly trying to recruit her as an employee because 
of her English language skills, but she has refused and instead 
initiated her own civil society project, mainly that of setting up 
a museum, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, January 7, 2007.
28
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
ations that are applicable to Tajikistan.40 However, 
participants are not necessarily drawn to cooperate 
with INGOs, because of their dedication to reform. 
As Thomas Carothers has observed, legal reform 
presents a particular paradox since the legal pro 
fessionals they want to work with “may lose power 
if hierarchical, ingrown managements systems are 
rationalized; they may lose control if outsiders start 
recommending and designing changes; and they 
may lose money and perquisites if corruption is re 
duced and transparency instituted.”41
In 2006, CEELI nominated local prosecutors to 
participate in a subsidized workshop in New York. 
Since the chief prosecutor was not on the list; he ob 
jected and stalled the application process.42 Corrup 
tion continues to be rampant even though there has 
been legislation since 1999 that prohibits the “use 
of one's status to resolve issues of personal interests 
or interests of one's close relatives of friends” and 
“violation of procedures established by law.”43 In 
addition, a national survey of the citizenry's percep 
tion of corruption indicates that people found law 
enforcement bodies, including courts and the pros 
ecutor's office, to be the most corrupt government 
institutions.44 Finally, despite the suggestions that 
these training programs are not having the intend 
ed long-term impact, they are used in donor reports 
as an indicator of a project's success.45 The number 
of training sessions conducted with information on 
the number of participants and the materials CEELI 
produces and hands out, such as the booklet called 
the Legal Reform Index, are the indicators that sup 
posedly measure the accomplishments of the IN- 
GO's projects.
But it is evident that these indicators cannot 
adequately evaluate the long-term impact of a 
project. Even when the legal actors are reform 
minded, they have no say in setting donor 
priorities. For instance, CEELI changes the focus 
of its training on an annual basis, depending on 
how donors earmark funds. The first-year training 
might focus primarily on ethics, and the following 
year it may focus on methods to combat trafficking. 
Consequently, legal actors have little opportunity
40. CEELI Report on training in Judicial Ethics, Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan, 2004.
41. Carothers, 175.
42. Interview with local staff attorney of the Criminal Law 
Program, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, December 28, 2007.
43. Article 12 of Anti-corruption law of the Republic of 
Tajikistan issued on December 1999.
44. Survey of the perception of corruption in the country 
conducted by the strategic research center with UNDP's col 
laboration 2006.
45. CEELI quarterly report for USAID, 2006.
to build on their previous skills. Although there is 
significant interaction between international and 
local actors with regard to judicial reform, only 
superficially is a civil society being created enabling 
to accommodate all actors, yet unable to make 
systemic changes.
CEELI's legal education programs have made 
admirable attempts at engaging students from lo 
cal schools, including the madras, the religious pri 
mary school.46 The program “My Civic Standing” 
uses university law students to help implement a 
“street law-style program in which law students 
prepare and conduct lessons on human rights and 
basic constitutional protections.” The program 
has reported several success stories, for example, 
when children have stood up to police officers, in 
sisting that they have no right to search them and 
make illegal requests for documention.47 However, 
this project reveals how INGOs often rely on local 
NGOs to help implement projects and demonstrate 
in donor reports that they are indeed cooperating 
with a vibrant home-grown civil society. In other 
words, INGOs often set up local NGOs or fund 
them as a way to guarantee their own economic 
survival and continue to renew their contracts 
with donors. Despite this cooperation, local NGOs 
often become subordinate to the Western INGO. 
Specifically, CEELI cooperates with the local NGO 
Student League of Lawyers, established in 2002, 
which is responsible for conducting the series of 
interactive legal education training sessions in the 
various schools. The League was established by 
law students who wished to assemble and build an 
association after the civil war. Initially, the league 
was most concerned with setting up activities such 
as moot court and a network that could help find 
students internships. As it began to receive funding 
from CEELI, the NGO began to cooperate closely 
on various projects. In a recent assessment of the 
NGO, students said “we do not feel ourselves as a 
separate organization from ABA/CEELI, we are like 
volunteers of ABA/CEELI.”48 In other words, the 
league of student lawyers was initially a local initia 
tive; but after receiving funding from CEELI, it has 
gradually lost its autonomy; now to a large extent 
the student lawyers must implement only activities 
approved by CEELI. The report also indicated that 
the student's inability to write grant proposals hin 
dered them from diversifying their funding and as
46. Although the Madras school in Dushanbe has recently 
rejected CEELI's offer to collaborate.
47. My Civic Standing Project Document, 2006.




a result activities would o ft en abruptly come to halt. 
Political Scientist Sarah Henderson coined the term 
“principled clientelism” to describe the dynamic 
between local NGOs and Western donors in Russia. 
By this term, Henderson refers to those Western or 
ganizations that have established a new hierarchy 
among local organizations. Whatever their inten 
tion, Western groups have thus bought the loyalties 
of local civic groups.49 Moreover, this relationship 
of interdependence established between CEELI and 
the student lawyers illustrates how even young re 
form-minded individuals invested in change be 
come subordinated to the priorities and values of 
the international community.
The INGOs' reliance on money from donors in 
order to survive also has the effect of there being 
little collaboration or coordination amongst the var 
ious INGO projects. Despite the fact that meetings 
are often held with regard to cooperation amongst 
INGOs, discussion of actual projects is rare. At a 
roundtable entitled “Development Partners,” held 
at the UN office on December 2, 2005, the declared 
aim was to “work together more effectively.” How 
ever, the meeting was reduced to give-and-take not 
about significant issues but about minutiae, such as 
how to obtain visas for the international staff and 
arriving consultants.50 Ultimately, bringing together 
the different actors to cooperate accomplishes very 
little in the way of concrete agreements.
In contrast to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan has been 
relatively tolerant toward the presence of INGOs 
as the government has until recently conducted a 
foreign policy that embraces Western governments. 
Nevertheless, CEELI has been singled out for pub 
lic criticism in the media for its legal education pro 
gram. For example, Jumhuriat (the Republic), the 
state newspaper, came out in November 2005 with 
an article written anonymously by an employee 
of the Ministry of Education. The article took the 
legal education program to task, accusing CEELI 
of having unclear goals and violating the terms 
of cooperation. Specifically the activities are “di 
rected toward agitation and spreading propaganda 
about Western values among the next generation.” 
Finally, according to the author, CEELI's programs 
have a negative influence on the consciousness 
of future generations of Tajik children by leading 
them to forget their Asian values, including respect 
for adults and children.51 In sum, CEELI has come 
to be identified as an INGO that is anti-state, em 
bodies Western values, and behaves according to 
political rather than humanitarian values. CEELI 
defended itself by reiterating the project mission as 
well as reminding Tajikistan that it wants to bring 
about democratization and that it was sharing the 
“government's expectation that the youth of Tajiki 
stan will play an active role in the development of 
their new democracy and in the advancement of the 
rule of law in Tajikistan.”52 However CEELI's exis 
tence in Tajikistan strongly depends on the backing 
of the US government. In fact, outraged, the US am 
bassador responded that he demanded an apology 
as these kinds of attacks on American organizations 
were threatening the good relations Tajikistan has 
with the United States.53 Clearly, what appears to 
be civil society projects invested in upholding hu 
man rights also serve as crucial tools in diplomatic 
relations. The stakes are too high for the Tajik state 
to threaten its relations with the US government. 
Thus, they are willing to make more compromises 
to tolerate the presence of CEELI. In other words, 
the capacity of INGOs to implement projects also 
greatly depends on how much support their spon 
soring government provides and how much lever 
age they have to influence the Tajik government.
The case of CEELI demonstrates how Western 
democracies with normative agendas that seek to 
transplant the concept of a vibrant civil society re 
sults in having mixed effects. The most evident ef 
fect is that the international community's presence 
has created a kind of civil society with its resources 
and links with the power of Western governments, 
which has led key urban local actors to reconfigure 
their interests. A Russian-Tajik woman who always 
worked as an English teacher for the Slavonic Uni 
versity, but also started programs to teach English 
to local staff working at INGOs, observed that she 
could no longer imagine Dushanbe without the in 
ternational community. Since the arrival of INGOs, 
modern services have begun to be introduced, in 
cluding luxury hotels, supermarkets, and restau 
rants, not to mention a French cafe that serves 
chocolate truffle cake and desert wines. But access 
to these kinds of goods requires that people have 
high salaries, and which is only possible if they are 
employed at a high level by an INGO—or if they 
are stalling the system by engaging in some kind of 
racket.54 Besides access to consumer goods, INGOs 
provide other professional services, which require
49. Henderson, 165.
50. Minutes, Development Round Table Discussion held 
UN office, December 2, 2005.
51. Jumhuriat, November, 2005.
52. CEELIs response in Jumhuriat, November 2005.
53. Public speech from the American Ambassador, No 
vember 2005.
54. Interview with English Teacher working for INGOs, 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, January 9, 2007.
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local actors to recast their interests in terms of West 
ern rights rhetoric. This is not to say that local actors 
are not interested in reform and democratization. 
However, both international actors and local actors 
have various interests which need to be reconciled. 
This process of reconciliation has signified that both 
international and local actors have their most basic 
interests met, mainly that of survival. This interac 
tion is then cloaked behind a romanticized vision of 
building civil society.
I
n conclusion, we should turn to the question 
of whether the bubble civil society developed 
through the world of INGOS ought to be re 
garded as detrimental to the local societies. The 
institutionalized mechanism of interaction between 
INGOs and Tajikistan could have long-term stul 
tifying effects to the degree that Rakhmon's au 
thoritarian regime has had the best opportunities 
to benefit from INGOs and their resources, while 
simultaneously preventing them from becoming a 
serious threat to his regime. Even if that is not their 
intention, INGOs by and large maintain the status 
quo of the old Soviet traditional key actors instead 
of promoting the autonomy of the potential young 
reformers with whom they work. Throughout my 
interviews, two expressions were commonly used 
to describe the impact of INGOs in Tajikistan. West 
erners working in Tajikistan sum up their pessi 
mism about reform on the part of the locals by say 
ing that they are stubborn: They “don't know how 
to think outside of the box.” In other words, the 
Tajiks are held to lack the sort of creativity needed 
to really build a strong civil society and let ”people 
power” prevail. This is a mistaken view. INGOs are 
hampered by their own lack of creativity and lack 
of understanding of the subtleties and historical in 
tricacies of the situation in Tajikistan.If we take this 
mechanical metaphor seriously, the lines of the box 
are drawn by Western assumptions about how a 
civil society is supposed to be created. On the other 
hand, when Tajiks are questioned about how they 
perceive the INGO community, they frequently an 
swer that “you can't just give people fish; you have 
to show them how to fish.” This sounds like a met 
aphor of dependency. In reality, it displays a more 
organic vision of the process of transferring re 
sources and skills. If you just throw them fish, they 
will simply take them and never think neither about 
how to catch them themselves or about the pond 
in which they have to survive. True, the “showing 
how” might only add to their dependency. But it is 
implied that “showing how” would bring greater
transparency and enable the local actors to become 
more autonomous.
The question remains, then, if the INGO neo- 
Tocquevillian model of civil society is the only one 
currently available. One alternative would be to ex 
amine a Muslim faith-based organization's vision of 
civil society, such as the Agha Khan Foundation in 
Tajikistan. Although the Agha Khan Foundation's 
civil society project document shares similarities 
with CEELI's project documents in that it expresses 
the need for a strong civil society to improve the 
quality of life, it operates within a different frame 
work than CEELI or other INGOs. The spiritual 
leader, Agha Khan, uses his foundation to provide 
assistance and fund civil society projects in coun 
tries with Ismaili populations, for example, Paki 
stan, Tanzania and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, this has 
meant that he funds projects mostly in the Pamir 
region, where there is a strong concentration of Is- 
mailis. The Agha Khan Foundation's project docu 
ment understands civil society as “bridging faith 
and society in a multifaceted development process 
involving economic, social and cultural activities. 
The program will therefore take a balanced ap 
proach, working with AKDN and its agencies as 
well as actors outside the AKDN system, includ 
ing CSOs, government, and business.”55 In other 
words, Agha Khan operates on the assumption 
that there is already a common shared ground for 
building a civil society—mainly that of the village 
organizations already connected around a com 
mon faith.56 In other words, Agha Khan Foundation 
is much more focused on working with existing 
forms of communal civil society, than introducing 
new networks or attempting to build civil society 
from scratch. Although Agha Khan projects are of 
ten isolated and in remote areas of Tajikistan, they 
have been successful in the Western sense of build 
ing a civil society, to the point that Pamiris have 
become very loyal to the organization, respecting 
and following “His Highness” the Agha Khan. In 
addition, the Agha Khan Foundation takes several 
initiatives to represent the Pamir region in domestic 
politics. For instance, he is in constant negotiation 
with President Rakhmon over providing resourc 
es to the Pamir region and setting up universities 
there. Most famously, he ensured that the Pamir 
region did not starve during the civil war by ship 
ping food. A case study would be needed to under 
stand the full range of activities and organizational 
behavior of the Agha Khan Institute, but clearly





organizers are able to construct a civil society with 
seemingly formal Western elements, because they 
are often operating on a common ground and with 
a shared vision of reform (mainly that of improving 
already existing social structures). Moreover, there 
is the idea that there is a sense of reciprocity—Agha 
Khan will help the citizens with activities, provid 
ing scholarships, and even representing them in the 
political arena during negotiations. In addition, the 
organization is set up so that Tajiks occupy all lead 
ership positions within the local offices. In turn, the 
citizens are very loyal to “His Highness,” and are 
enforcing his base of power as a world religion. On 
the other hand, it can be argued that the Agha Khan 
Foundation is not promoting a cohesive national 
civil society because he only supports one region— 
mainly the Pamir. This often causes envy and re 
sentment for the region, as students have access to 
far more funds for scholarships and opportunities 
to go abroad. In sum, short of knowing more about 
the operations of non-Western paradigms of civil 
society, as they are organized through non-Western 
NGOs, we have to rest our case that the neo-Toc- 
quevillian route does not yield the universal good 
that it claims to be working towards.
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